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This chapter describes some ways in which the psychology of cognition, emo­
tion, and memory can or might be applied in several practical settings. Recent 
years have seen a rapid growth in research on cognition and emotion and this 
research has been summarized in a variety of sources (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 
1988, 1989; Ellis, Varner, & Becker, in press; Fiedler & Forgas, 1988; lsen, 
1.984; Kuiken, 1989; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). Moreover, a new journal appeared in 1987, Cognition and Emotion, which is entirely 
devoted to relations among emotional states and the full range of cognitive 
processes typically studied by psychologists. Ellis and Ashbrook (1989) noted 
that although this research area has a much earlier history of activity, it lay 
relatively dormant until the mid-l 970s. However, its growth has accelerated 
rapidly until it has now become an important and active area of research and 
theoretical deveJopment. 
We believe that a discussion of the application of this area is now timely, and it 
is prof�table to consider how the domain of cognition, emotion and memory is 
either currently or potentially applicable. In this chapter we have not attempted to 
be comprehensive in detailing a number of applications; rather, we have selec­
tively focused on four arenas of application either in progress or having potential 
application. These include the maintenance and repair of disturbed moods, cog­
nition and emotion in health behaviors, emotion and eyewitness testimony, and 
emotional states in human performance. 
199 
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR 
OF DISTURBED MOODS 
Most of us occasionally experience episodes of disturbed affect from which we 
wish to escape. For some such disturbance qualifies as a depressive or anxiety­
related disorder, whereas others are affected on a more transient or less profound 
basis. Regardless of the severity of the disturbance, it appears to be characterized 
by identifiable patterns of cognitive phenomena and concomitant complaints. 
One important direction for the application of research on cognition and emotion, 
then, is provided by its implications for mood maintenance and subsequent 
repair. Moods are maintained by ongoing cognitive functions. Mood distur­
bances are repaired by changes in these functions or in their focus. 
We identify two categories of ways in which negative mood states-anxiety 
and depression, in particular-might be maintained and repaired through the 
involvement of cognitive procedures. The first category concerns the direct 
involvement of cognitive procedures in maintenance and repair. In this category, 
we briefly outline the literature on mood congruency, or the focus of mental 
processes on episodes and materials that are meaningfully related to the mood 
state. We also describe research concerning the nature of impairments experi­
enced when depressed and anxious people encounter the relatively neutral mate­
rials of their educational and occupational endeavors. 
The second type of cognitive involvement in the maintenance and repair of 
disturbed affect is indirect. Disturbed moods are indirectly maintained by failures 
to perform well in cognitive tasks. Test-anxious students, for example, become 
increasingly anxious with each failure. Depressed people perhaps remain de­
pressed as long as they fail to achieve in ways that provide social approbation or 
increase self-esteem. Improving cognitive performance indirectly assists in mood 
repair by helping mood-impaired people to experience self-efficacy and to 
achieve important goals (see Hertel, in press). In these ways cognitive procedures 
are indirectly implicated, because the disturbed moods are maintained or repaired 
by the outcomes of cognitive tasks. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that 
disturbed moods are centrally associated with the tendency to perform poorly in 
the first place (see Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). In each of the following sections on 
the maintenance and repair of disturbed moods, we address both the direct and 
the indirect nature of emotional and cognitive interactions. 
Mood Maintenance 
Disturbed moods are maintained by selective attention to mood-congruent as­
pects of current and past experience (lsen, 1984; W illiams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988). Attention to mood-congruent elements of an event appears to 
be a relatively automatic process and, moreover, one that diverts attention away 
from more task-appropriate processing. Such selectivity maintains the disturbed 
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mood directly by bringing congruent information to mind and indirectly by 
impeding performance on the task at hand. Mood maintenance can also result 
from selective remembering of past events, and if the mood-impaired person 
actively rehearses these negatively valenced memories the moods are further 
maintained. We next describe a few examples to illustrate the evidence for mood­
congruent attention and remembering and to suggest their involvement in the 
maintenance of disturbed moods. 
Selective Attention. To what extent do mood-congruent materials capture the 
attention of mood-impaired people? The evidence suggests that anxiety in partic­
ular is associated with such selective attention (see Williams et al., 1988). For 
example, in a study by Eysenck, Macleod, and Mathews (1987) trait-anxious 
subjects more often than nonanxious subjects spelled homophones (such as 
die/dye) to coincide with the more threatening concept. Much earlier, Postman 
and Brown ( 1952) demonstrated similarly that depressed subjects detected 
failure-related words at very brief exposures more frequently than did non­
depressed people and more frequently than other words. Symptoms of depression 
and anxiety are highly correlated, so we cannot address the specificity of the 
selectivity to a particular type of disturbance, but we can conclude that disturbed 
moods are associated with attention to mood congruent information. 
Consider the implications of such evidence for performance in typical cog­
nitive tasks. The kinds of tasks that anxious and depressed people typically 
encounter in educational and occupational settings are usuaJly neutral, in that the 
materials are not particularly related to the nature of their moods. Yet the tasks 
dearly provide potential sources of threat and failure if one's ongoing perfor­
mance of them is evaluated self-referentially. In this manner, disturbed moods 
encourage the allocation of attention to inappropriate aspects of the self or the 
situation and distract attention away from task-appropriate processing (see Ellis 
& Ashbrook, 1988; Ingram, 1990). By making the assumption that attentional 
resources are limited, we can understand how mood-impaired people might not 
perform well on what are thought to be neutral tasks. Thus, selective attention to 
mood-congruent aspects of current processing episodes directly maintains the 
disturbance by bringing such information to mind and indirectly maintains the 
disturbance by hampering performance on everyday cognitive tasks. 
Selective Remembering. Disturbed moods also guide the recruitment of 
mood-related memories. Mood-congruent retrieval can occur on a relatively 
automatic basis (i.e., when people are not consciously attempting to remember 
events from the past, but make use of them in the performance of some other 
task), o r  they can occur in more controJled episodes of remembering. 
As an illustration of possible automatic effects of mood-congruent retrieval, 
consider a study by Mathews, Mogg, May, and Eysenck (1989). In the first phase 
of the experiment, anxious and nonanxious subjects imagined scenes for threat-
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ening and nonthreatening words and judged their pleasantness. This phase was 
followed by two tests. In one test, subjects were given three-letter stems for old 
and new words and instructed to complete them with the first word that came to 
mind. The anxious subjects completed the stems of old threatening words more 
often than other types of words, but nonanxious subjects did not show this bias in 
recruiting threatening materials from the first phase. In the other test, the subjects 
were asked to use the three-letter stems as cues for conscious recall of the 
Phase-I words; here, their recall of threatening material was not reliably corre­
lated with anxiety (also see Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). Furthermore, some­
times anxiety is associated with reduced recall of threatening materials (see 
Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1987). 
Others (see Mueller, 1980) have shown anxiety-congruent effects, so the story 
regarding intentional recall by anxious subjects is not a simple one (see Ingram & 
Kendall, 1987). But the evidence regarding depression is much clearer: De­
pressed people tend to recall negatively valenced events from the past (see 
reviews by Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981; Johnson & Magaro, 1987). W illiams et 
al. ( 1988, chap. 10) believed that the picture regarding depressive versus anxious 
recall can be clarified by considering the different momentary goals of depressed 
and anxious people. 
Williams and colleagues proposed that depression and anxiety involve differ­
ent types of biased processing of mood-related events. Quick detection of poten­
tial threat is a central concern of the fearful person, thus automatic processes 
involved in the allocation of attention are sensitive to anxious moods. Then, 
depending on whether subsequent avoidance of continued exposure to the threat 
is an important goal, controlled processes might divert attention from its source. 
In this manner, anxious subjects would not elaborately process threatening mate­
rials on initial exposure and therefore would not have cues available for subse­
quent intentional recall. The effects of depression are in some ways opposite to 
the effects of anxiety, according to Williams and colleagues. The depressed 
person actively processes negative information at the time of initial exposure by 
attempting to reconcile that information in the context of goals for overcoming 
depression. 
In short, the differing goals of depressed and anxious people have correspond­
ing implications for the processes involved in mood maintenance and repair. The 
answer to the question of whether mood-congruent retrieval serves to maintain 
disturbed moods depends importantly on subsequent processing of the retrieved 
episode. If that subsequent processing does not achieve a change in mood state, 
the ongoing mood is maintained or enhanced by attention to mood-related as­
pects of experience. 
Mood Repair 
Clark and !sen ( 1982) were among the first to point out that disturbed moods are 
repaired by controlled processing of mood-related information (cf. Blaney, 
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1986). Active avoidance of mood-related materials can (at least temporarily) 
inhibit the feeling state; active rehearsal of mood-related materials can reconcile 
their meaning in the service of achieving self-control (Rehm, 1982). These are 
examples of direct actions of cognitive procedures in the repair of disturbed 
moods. These direct effects are illuminated by considering cognitive/behavioral 
approaches to treatments of anxiety and depression. 
Direct Effects in Therapeutic Intervention. Cognitive/behavioral therapies 
are effective approaches to the treatment of depression (e.g., Teasdale, Fennell, 
Hibbert, & Amies, 1984) and anxiety (e.g., Wine, 1980). Often, they employ 
techniques of "cognitive restructuring" of depressive or worrisome thoughts into 
more realistic appraisals (Teasdale, 1983). How would research on basic cog­
nitive processes inform our understanding of how cognitive restructuring and 
other therapeutic techniques repair disturbed moods? 
According to the analysis by W illiams and colleagues (1988), remediation is 
achieved in several ways. First, by encouraging the client to recall positive or 
neutral aspects of their experience, the therapist directs attentional resources 
away from mood-maintaining episodes. However, attention is redirected in the 
context of the client's retrieval of negative-valenced ideations, such that the 
rehearsal of realistic thoughts increase the probability that they will be selected 
on future occasions of the same type (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). 
Second, by maintaining attention to negatively valenced events, the therapist can 
use extinction or counterconditioning procedures to alter the valence of a particu­
lar memory. This potential is particularly rich in the case of anxiety, in which 
avoidance-motivated controlled procedures operate. By hampering the tendency 
to avoid threat, its impact can be chaJlenged (Foa & Kozak, 1986). 
Therapeutic interventions provide good examples of the direct involvement of 
cognitive procedures in mood repair. We tum our attention next to the topic of 
their indirect involvement through attempts to improve performance of mood­
impaired people on typically neutral cognitive tasks. 
Indirect Involvement of Cognitive Procedures in Mood Repair. Improving 
cognitive performance by depressed and anxious people can help them to achieve 
the goals that might eventually assist in mood repair (Hertel, in press). Memory 
complaints, for example, are common diagnostic indices of depression. We 
speculate that depressed (and usually anxious) people do not worry about their 
memory foibles simply because they dislike forgetting, but also because they are 
concerned about their performances at school and in the workplace. A major 
characteristic of depression, in particular, is the downward spiral produced by 
decreasing achievements. We therefore question whether such failures are inev­
itable concomitants of depression or if achievement can be attained without 
mood-related interventions. 
Deficits in the allocation of attention to task-appropriate procedures are asso­
ciated with anxiety (Eysenck, 1982; W ine, 1980) and depressive moods and 
204 ELLIS AND HERTEL 
disorders (see Ellis, Thomas, McFarland, & Lane, 1985; Ellis, Thomas, & 
Rodriguez, 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Roy-Byrne, Weingartner, Bierer, 
Thompson, & Post, 1981). To some extent, these deficits might be biochemically 
endemic to the disorders, through reduced production of neurotransmitters; phar­
macological agents that slow their re-uptake seem to improve performance on 
some types of mental activities (see Weingartner & Herrmann, in press). How­
ever, we do know that the attentional resources that are available to depressed and 
anxious people are sometimes allocated inappropriately to task-irrelevant 
thoughts. Therefore, any procedure that directs allocation to task-appropriate 
processes has the potential to improve the cognitive performance of mood­
impaired people. 
Consider the results of an experiment conducted by Hertel and Rude (1991 a) 
that compared the performance of clinically depressed (and often anxious) outpa­
tients to the performance of recovered outpatients and nonpsychiatric controls. 
The task consisted of a learning phase, in which subjects made decisions about 
the semantic fit of words in sentence frames, and a remembering phase, in which 
recall of the targeted words was unexpectedly requested. In one condition of the 
learning phase, subjects were required to pay attention to each target in. the 
context of the sentence frame for the duration of the trial. In the other condition 
(with the same trial duration), subjects' attention was unconstrained. Compared 
to both control groups, depressed subjects in this Jatter condition recalled fewer 
targets on the subsequent test, but mood-related differences were not produced 
by subjects who were required to pay attention. Depressive deficits in recall can 
be eliminated by guiding the procedures that are appropriate to the situation (see 
Ellis, 1990; Hertel & Rude, 199lb). 
An examination of evidence for depressive deficits in a variety of cognitive 
tasks suggests that depressed subjects typically suffer deficits in cognitive ini­
tiative (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). That is, they do not spontaneously employ 
cognitive procedures and strategies that characterize the performance of non­
depressed subjects. For example, experimental inductions of depressed moods by 
Leight and Ellis ( 1981) produced poor detection of the optimal learning strategy, 
but did not significantly hamper its use if it had been detected in a nondepressed 
state. Similarly, depressed subjects in concept learning and problem-solving 
tasks have difficulty producing hypotheses, but seem unimpaired in their ability 
to test hypotheses provided by the experimenters (see Abramson, Alloy, & 
Rosoff, 1981; Silberman, Weingartner, & Post, 1983). In these types of tasks, the 
mind seems to "go blank" when a strategy is needed (Watts, MacLeod, & 
Morris, 1988). Thus, depressive disorders may involve metacognitive impair­
ments, such as in the ability or tendency to monitor cognitive performance (Slife 
& Weaver, in press). Clinical researchers have focused on the phenomenon of 
impaired initiative in broader contexts of depression (see Coyne & Gotlib, 1983), 
contexts that likely involve the need to plan, monitor, and concoct strategies. 
In short, depressed people need help in determining what to do if they are to 
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perform well in cognitive tasks. Although less is known about the metacognitive 
functions of purely anxious people (e.g., nondepressed students with high levels 
of test anxiety), their high degree of distractibiJity suggests that procedural in­
struction would also benefit their performance. Hertel (in press) outlined general 
guidelines to be used in attempts to improve the cognitive performance of de­
pressed and anxious people. However, the practical advice that cognitive re­
search currently can provide is somewhat limited. In this regard, Watkins (1990) 
seemed to be right in calling for the development of a taxonomy of procedures 
involved in typical cognitive tasks. 
The larger arena of our concern with improving performance is mood repair. 
If depressed and anxious people get the kind of help they need, their sense of 
efficacy would no doubt improve. Bandura 's ( 1977) work on self-efficacy has 
been extended to the domain of cognitive tasks by Hertzog (in press). When 
feeling efficacious, mood-impaired people-like other people-attempt more 
difficult cognitive tasks and are more persistent in their execution. The implica­
tions are clear: If we assist mood-impaired people in the selection of strategies 
for perfonning some cognitive tasks, experiences of success on those tasks might 
generalize to new situations. The hope is that such sma11 successes would ulti­
mately contribute to mood repair and future research on mood-related cognition 
will point the way to achieving these goals. 
COGNITION AND EMOTION 
IN HEALTH BEHAVIORS 
The area of health psychology has emerged in the past 25 years as an important 
focus both for research and for practical applications in professional settings 
(Kaplan, 1990). Much of health psychology in its early days was seen as part of 
or related to behavioral medicine and was therefore viewed as an area in which 
changes in the behavioral (unhealthy) activities of patients were brought about 
principalJy by behavioral strategies and techniques. Seen in this light, unhealthy, 
risky, or damaging behaviors were to be reduced or eliminated and substituted by 
new, healthy appropriate behaviors. Accordingly, considerable emphasis was 
placed on behavior modification procedures and activities derived from operant 
conditioning procedures. 
The role of cognitive processes in health has received substantial recognition 
in recent years. The contribution of cognitive styles and activities to a diverse 
number of health problems such as arthritis, hypertension, cancer, elevated blood 
cholesterol, and heart disease has been widely discussed and is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. Reviews of this extensive literature can be seen in many sources 
(e.g., Rodin & Salovey, J 989). The importance of cognitive processes in health 
has been recently highlighted by Seeman ( 1989), who stated that the cognitive 
subsystem is "a domain that is so powerful in its impact on health that it would 
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be difficult to overstate its centrality. In this domain, theory and research con­
verge to explain many facets of health behavior" (p. 1105). Examples of this 
connection between cognition and health can be seen in Hamilton's ( 1982) model 
of cognition as a way of explaining a person's appraisal and response to stress 
situations, Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) model of stress, which is based on 
cognitive processes including a person's interpretation of situations, Ellis and 
Ashbrook's ( 1988) model of depression and memory, and Ottaviani and Becks' 
(1988) cognitive theory of depression. 
Prevailing conceptions of cognition and health have focused on the role of 
cognitive processes as contributing factors in disease and, alternatively, on the 
importance of positive cognitive outcomes as the result of various treatments. 
More recently, the role of cognitive psy chology 's contribution to health has been 
raised from another perspective. This third perspective examines what role con­
cepts and principles from cognitive psychology might play in designing pro­
grams for the improvement of health. Consider, for example, a few instances of 
concepts in cognitive psychology such as automatic and effortful processing, the 
generation effect in memory, organization, elaboration, rehearsal, retrieval, se­
lective attention, implicit memory, distinctiveness, heuristics, imagery, reality 
monitoring, schemas, spreading activation and network models, state-dependent 
effects, encoding specificity, the self-referent effect, inferences in comprehen­
sion, mnemonic strategies, autobiographical memory, chunking, context effects, 
rules for categorization, mood congruence, and the like. The majority of these 
concepts have been extensively studied and have substantial experimental sup-· 
port. We therefore believe that it is appropriate that concepts from both cognition 
and emotion be considered as useful candidates for application to the solution of 
health issues. We have in mind a program of application in which these concepts, 
principles, and experimental findings be examined and evaluated for their poten­
tial or actual application to health issues. One way that this issue could be 
approached is to determine what concrete, practical applications might be made 
of specific concepts from cognition and emotion. As an example of this enter­
prise, a recent informal conference (1990) was organized by John Kihlstrom and 
Rodney Cocking in which experts in the field of cognition, emotion, and moti­
vation met, under National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) auspices, and 
began an initial exploration of how such concepts might be applied by acquired 
immunodeficiency sy ndrome (AIDS)-specialists who are concerned with the 
control and reduction of risky behaviors associated with this disease. I t  is the 
case that unsafe sexual activity and drug consumption are behaviors that occur 
under emotional conditions so it is clear that any applications of cognitive con­
cepts must be made in the context of what is known about emotion as well. The 
conference was a preliminary step toward more planning, so little can be reported 
at this moment. W hat this does illustrate, however, is the beginning of an 
enterprise that we view as very important. 
EMOTION AND EYEWITNESS.T ESTIMONY 
The last 20 years have seen a resurgence of interest in eyewitness testimony both 
with respect to basic research questions and to the application of knowledge 
about eyewitness testimony to the courtroom (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 
1989; E. F. Loftus, 1983, 1986; Wells, 1986). A considerable body of knowl­
edge about many facets of eyewitness research, including factors associated with 
the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, has grown. These include such topics 
as the lack of any substantive correlation between eyewitness accuracy and 
witness confidence, the effects of misleading postevent information and the 
assumption of memory integration (E. F. Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), weap­
on focus (E. F. Loftus, G. R. Loftus, & Messo, 1987), knowledge of jurors 
about eyewitness perception and memory (Deffenbacker & E. F. Loftus, 1982), 
and cross-racial identification bias (Brigham & Malpass, 1985), which are only a 
few examples of this large research domain. 
Recently Kassin and associates (1989) classified 21 major eyewitness testi­
mony topics ranging from the wording of questions, lineup instructions, stress, 
event violence to weapon focus and cross-racial identification. Experts in the 
area were asked to judge each topic with respect to the reliability of the experi­
mental evidence, whether or not the expert would testify, whether the expert had 
testified, and whether the topic was of common knowledge to potential jurors. Of 
the 21 topics, 13 were judged to be sufficiently reliable to be presented in court 
by 70% or more of the experts. Topics such as wording of questions, lineup 
instructions, and the effects of postevent information were judged to be highly 
reliable, whereas the topic of gender differences in eyewitness testimony was 
judged to be low in reliability. 
For our purposes the topics of stress or emotional factors, weapon focus, and 
the role of postevent information in memory integration are most pertinent to our 
concerns. Knowledge about these topics is of obvious practical importance for 
any experimental cognitive psychologist who chooses to testify in court and the 
specific issue in all of these is the role that emotional factors play, if any, in 
weapon focus and in memory integration. And, more generally, what role do 
emotional states play in any aspect of eyewitness identification and testimony? 
With respect to ·the issue of weapon focus, E. F. Loftus (1979) initially 
assumed that this was an expected occurrence when an individual was highly 
aroused. She assumed that in an obviously frightening situation, with a weapon 
pointed directly at a person, the person would selectively focus on the weapon to 
the neglect of other details. Subsequently, critics noted that although the idea was 
certainly feasible, there was no solid evidence to support it. As a result, Loftus 
conducted several studies that are summarized in E. F. Loftus and associates 
( 1987), which do demonstrate the viability of weapon focus as an identifiable 
result of emotional effects on perception and memory of a threatening event. 
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The issue of memory integration is somewhat more complex. E. F. Loftus and 
associates ( 1978) argued that postevent information becomes integrated with the 
earlier learned information so as to become integrated or blended into a single 
memory. The extreme of this position is that there is only the integrated memory 
as distinct from two separate memories. Alternatively, there may be both an 
integrated memory plus portions of the two separate memories. However, Mc­
Closkey and Zaragoza (1985) and Bekerian and Bowers (1983) argued that 
Loftus' findings do not necessarily reflect an integration process but rather are 
the result of response bias and/ or problems in the integration paradigm and a 
controversy as to the interpretation of Loftus' original findings continues today. 
Thus the status of the original memory still remains controversial, and it conceiv­
ably may be transformed, lost, or perhaps remains simply inaccessible (e.g., 
E. F. Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989; Zaragoza & McCloskey, 
1989). 
For our purposes, however, the question is: Do emotional states affect the 
memory integration process? To our knowledge there is only one piece of evi­
dence on this question and the answer is decidedly positive. Franklin (1985) 
conducted a study using the E. F. Loftus and associates' ( 1978) paradigm but 
introduced a mood induction procedure. As in Loftus' study, subjects were given 
either misleading infonnation or no information after observing a simulated 
automobile-pedestrian accident. In addition, Franklin gave subjects either a neu­
tral or depressed mood induction following their observation of the accident. She 
found that misleading information produced less accurate recognition of the 
accident in both depressed and neutral mood subjects, and the effects of'mislead­
ing infonnation were much greater in depressed subjects. It should be noted that, 
in this case, depression does not disrupt the encoding of the misleading infonna­
tion. If subjects had failed to encode the misleading information, then the de­
pressed subjects would have shown Jess tendency to have been mislead by the 
questionnaire. In short, Franklin's (1985) study shows clearly that the induction 
of a depressed mood amplifies the effects of misleading information. 
As for emotion and memory in general, there is a substantial body of evidence 
indicating that emotional states, whether natural or experimentally induced, in­
fluence memory in a variety of settings (e.g., Blaney, 1986; Ellis & Ashbrook, 
1988, 1989; Johnson & Magaro, 1987; Williams et al., 1988). For example, Ellis 
showed that the induction of depressed mood states produces poorer recall in a 
variety of settings including organizational effects (Leight & Ellis, 1981), elab­
orative encoding, semantic processing, and effortful tasks (Ellis et al., 1984), 
retrieval effects (Ellis et al., 1985), transfer of strategies (Leight & Ellis, 1981 ) , 
and thought listing and memory (Ellis, Seibert, & Herbert, 1990; Seibert & Ellis, 
1991 ). It is quite reasonable to assume that these effects could also appear in 
studies of eyewitness testimony, although comparable conditions have not yet 
been researched. 
Not all experiments have shown recall decrements with depression and it 
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appears to be the case that depressive deficits are most likely to occur with 
relatively intense emotional states and with relatively demanding criterion tasks 
(e.g., Ellis, 1985; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hertel & Hardin, 1990). Finally, the 
few studies of memory under extreme emotion appear to yield mixed results. In 
his review of these effects, Baddeley (1990) noted that not only do prosecution 
and defense lawyers differ in their opinions about the effects of extreme emotion, 
but the mixed experimental results do follow a reasonable pattern. Studies using 
a high level of arousal usually find an impairment of memory, whereas studies 
employing low levels of arousal report either no effects or small facilitation 
effects on memory. 
There are ways in which eyewitness testimony for events can be improved 
based on principles of memory. Ellis (1987) described nine general principles, 
such as elaboration, organization, distinctiveness, and the practice of retrieval, 
whose application can be used to facilitate memory. Similarly, Fisher and 
Geiselman ( 1988) developed what they called the cognitive interview designed to 
facilitate retri�val of information based on four general principles: (a) mentally 
reinstating the environment and personal contact that occurred at the time the 
crime was witnessed; (b) encouraging the reporting of all details; (c) attempting 
to recall the incident in several different orders, and (d) reporting the incident 
from several different perspectives. In a test of this interview procedure, 
Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, and Ho1land (1985) found approximately a 35% 
improvement in recall over the standard police interview procedures. 
Finally, the role of emotion in the related topic of flashbulb memories is an 
issue of considerable debate (Neisser & W inograd, 1993). It is not possible to 
summarize the large literature on flashbulb memories in any simple fashion here. 
In general, there is a positive relation between degree of emotion and the vivid­
ness of the memory. In contrast, the role of affect in memory accuracy seems 
more complex. We are in agreement with Reisberg and Heuer ( 1993), who 
concluded that flashbulb memories are undermined by emotion in some situa­
tions by impeding retrieval, whereas emotion may improve memory for some 
sorts of material as seen, say, in the mood-congruence situation. 
EMOTIONAL STATES 
AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
This section briefly considers the significance of emotional states for human 
perfonnance. Newspaper reports of aircraft accidents frequently note that stress 
was a factor in producing pilot error and, similarly, aircraft controllers have been 
observed to make errors in judgment when under conditions of stress produced 
by heavy workloads (cf. Ellis & Hunt, 1993). Newspaper reports, personal 
experiences, and everyday observations of events all attest to the idea that human 
perfonnance can be readily influenced by emotional states. As Darke (1988) 
210 ELLIS AND HERTEL 
observed, the research literature provides strong evidence that emotional states, 
such as anxiety, produce performance decrements, especially with capacity de­
manding tasks. Similarly, Ellis and Ashbrook (1988), in their resource allocation 
model, proposed that induced or natural mood states will have their most pro­
nounced effects on difficult, demanding, poorly structured, or highly effortful 
tasks. And a large number of experiments support this generalization. 
The literature on fear, dangerous environments, and performance has been 
reviewed by ldzikowski and Baddeley (1983) and points to a wide range of 
performance decrements associated with fear. Likewise, Sarason (1975) showed 
test performance decrements due to anxiety in a number of settings and the 
effects appear to be amplified with more difficult tasks. The effects, however, are 
not always simple, with anxiety at low levels facilitating performance as the 
result of arousal, but anxiety at high levels interfering with performance due to 
increased distraction. Indeed, the process of distraction has been assumed to be 
important by Ellis and Franklin (1983) in accounting for personality styles on 
memory performance and by Ellis and colleagues (1990) and by Seibert and EJlis 
( 1991) in accounting for the way in which thinking about irrelevant tasks (dis­
tracting thoughts) interferes with memory. Other studies (e.g., Mueller, 1979) 
have also reported detrimental effects of anticipated danger on memory. 
Baddeley ( 1990) also described the effects of emotion on simulated combat 
performance. Walker and Burkhardt (1965) looked at error performance in weap­
ons control systems and found that the error rates in operating bomb and missile 
control systems increased as stress levels increased. This finding is, of course, 
quite consistent with the predicted interaction between emotional levels and task 
demands as proposed by the Ellis-Ashbrook (1988) resource allocation model 
and by Revelle and Loftus' model ( 1990). 
Finally, an important feature of much of the research on emotional effects on 
performance attempts either to produce the emotional state under highly realistic 
conditions or to examine performance in work settings (e.g., Walker & Burk­
hardt, 1965) or both. In an interesting set of experiments, Keinen, Friedland, and 
Arad (1991) simulated stress in a very convincing manner. In the high stress 
condition, subjects were trainees in a parachuting course just learning to jump. 
They were sitting on a runway, harnessed with their parachutes, waiting to board 
an airplane for their first night parachute jump. Parachute jumping can reason­
ably be said to be a stressful experience (Keinen, 1986) and it may be further 
assumed that inexperience and the prospect of parachuting in the night would add 
to the subjects' stress. In the low stress condition, the subjects carried out the 
criterion task during a I-day break in training. The criterion task was a classifica­
tion procedure in which subjects categorized a list of objects. Interestingly, 
subjects under high stress categorized the objects more rapidly but employed 
fewer groups to categorize the objects than did the low stress subjects, suggesting 
less attention to distinctive features or an overgeneralization process due to 
stress. 
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We summarize by noting that the study of emotional states and human perfor­
mance has considerable practical importance. Many of our everyday tasks are 
performed under transient or prolonged emotional states and it is therefore impor­
tant to understand the role of emotion in human performance as well as ways in 
which individuals might learn to cope with stress and intense emotional states 
while engaged in demanding tasks. Some suggestions of how the latter might be 
accomplished were mentioned in the earlier section on the maintenance and 
repair of disturbed moods. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has examined four areas in which research findings and theory in the 
domain of cognition and emotion might be applied to practical settings. These 
include the maintenance and repair of disturbed moods, cognition and emotion in 
health behaviors, emotion and eyewitness testimony, and the role o f  emotional 
states in human performance. Disturbed moods were seen to be maintained by 
mood congruent aspects of current and past experiences that involve both selec­
tive attention and selective remembering. Mood repair can occur by way of direct 
effects o f  therapeutic intervention or by the indirect involvement of cognitive 
procedures in mood repair. The issue of mood repair is the more fundamental of 
our concerns. Cognition and emotion research is beginning to play an even more 
important role in  designing programs for improving health behaviors. Several 
models of cognition and emotion have been developed that do have value in 
organizing health programs. The role of emotion in eyewitness testimony was 
examined with respect to weapon focus and memory integration. Weapon focus 
now appears to be a valid phenomenon and depressed mood states do interfere 
with memory in the Loftus integration paradigm. Finally, emotional states have 
long been shown to interfere with human performance in a variety of tasks and 
these effects are greatest with effortful, demanding tasks. 
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